Allegations concerning organized crime represent some of the most serious accusations under Turkish criminal law. Unlike ordinary criminal offenses, investigations involving an alleged criminal organization often allow prosecutors to employ broader investigative measures, including interception of communications, covert surveillance, search and seizure, and, where the statutory requirements are satisfied, pre-trial detention.
The legal basis for these offenses is primarily found in Article 220 of the Turkish Penal Code No. 5237 ("TPC"), which criminalizes the establishment, management and membership of organizations formed for the purpose of committing offenses. The provision is intended to enable law enforcement authorities to intervene before an organized criminal structure produces extensive criminal harm, while at the same time ensuring that criminal liability is imposed only where the statutory elements of the offense have been fully established.
In practice, however, determining whether a particular group of individuals constitutes a "criminal organization" is rarely straightforward. Turkish courts consistently emphasize that not every collaboration between several persons amounts to an organized criminal structure. Likewise, the mere commission of multiple offenses by several individuals does not automatically establish the existence of a criminal organization within the meaning of Article 220 TPC.
The distinction is of considerable practical importance. A finding that an organization exists may expose suspects to separate criminal liability in addition to responsibility for the underlying offences. It may also significantly influence procedural measures adopted during the investigation, including arrest decisions, evidentiary measures and the overall strategy of the prosecution.
This article examines the legal structure of Article 220 TPC, the constituent elements required for the establishment of a criminal organization, the distinction between organized crime and ordinary participation in crime, the criminal liability of founders, managers and members, the procedural aspects of criminal investigations, and practical defence considerations under Turkish criminal law.
Article 220 TPC protects public order and public security by preventing the formation of organized criminal structures capable of repeatedly committing offenses.
The rationale behind the provision is that an organized criminal structure creates a greater danger than an isolated criminal act. A criminal organization possesses continuity, internal discipline and the capacity to commit multiple offenses over time. For this reason, Turkish criminal law considers the establishment of such an organization to be independently punishable, even before every intended offence has been carried out.
Nevertheless, criminal liability does not arise merely because several individuals cooperate in connection with unlawful conduct. The law requires the existence of a genuine organizational structure that demonstrates continuity, hierarchy and the practical ability to pursue criminal objectives.
This approach reflects one of the fundamental principles of modern criminal law: criminal liability must be based on concrete legal criteria rather than assumptions derived solely from the number of participants or the seriousness of the alleged offenses.
Article 220 TPC regulates several distinct offenses relating to criminal organizations. The provision covers not only those who establish or manage such organizations but also individuals who knowingly become members and, under certain circumstances, persons whose conduct is legally connected to the activities of the organization.
Although the wording of Article 220 appears relatively concise, its application has been shaped extensively by the jurisprudence of the Turkish Court of Cassation. Judicial decisions have clarified that the existence of a criminal organization depends upon the presence of objective legal criteria rather than formal labels used during the investigation.
Accordingly, prosecutors must demonstrate that the alleged organization possesses characteristics such as a hierarchical structure, continuity beyond a single criminal act, a sufficient number of participants and an operational capacity capable of achieving its criminal objectives. The absence of these elements may prevent the application of Article 220, even where several individuals have jointly participated in criminal conduct.
For this reason, courts conduct a comprehensive assessment of the factual circumstances of each case instead of relying exclusively on the existence of communication between suspects or their simultaneous involvement in one or more offences.
The following sections examine each of these legal elements in greater detail and explain how Turkish criminal courts distinguish a criminal organization from ordinary joint participation in crime.
Determining whether a particular group constitutes a criminal organization under Article 220 TPC requires considerably more than proving that several individuals committed one or more offenses together. Turkish criminal law distinguishes organized criminal structures from ordinary joint participation by requiring the presence of specific objective criteria. These criteria have been developed through both statutory interpretation and the consistent jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation.
Accordingly, criminal liability under Article 220 cannot be based solely on the seriousness of the alleged offences or the number of suspects involved. Instead, courts examine the factual circumstances of each case to determine whether the alleged organization possesses the structural characteristics required by law.
A criminal organization must consist of at least three individuals. This requirement is expressly established by Article 220 TPC and reflects the legislature's intention to distinguish organized criminal structures from bilateral criminal cooperation.
Nevertheless, the existence of three or more individuals does not automatically establish a criminal organization. The numerical requirement merely constitutes the minimum threshold. Prosecutors must still demonstrate that these individuals formed an organized structure with the purpose of committing offences rather than merely acting together in relation to an isolated criminal incident.
Consequently, courts evaluate not only the number of participants but also the nature of their relationship, their respective functions and whether their cooperation demonstrates characteristics that extend beyond ordinary criminal participation.
Perhaps the most significant characteristic of a criminal organization is the existence of a hierarchical relationship among its members.
Hierarchy does not necessarily require a rigid military-style chain of command or formally designated leadership positions. Rather, the prosecution must establish that the participants operate within an organizational framework in which authority, coordination and decision-making are distributed in a manner that enables the group to function as a continuing criminal entity.
Turkish courts frequently emphasize that the defining feature is not the formality of the hierarchy but its practical existence. Individuals should perform complementary roles within the organization, and the organizational structure must allow coordinated action toward common criminal objectives.
Where the evidence merely demonstrates cooperation between individuals acting on equal terms without any identifiable organizational structure, the statutory requirements of Article 220 may not be satisfied.
Relevant excerpts from the decision of the 9th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, File No. 2011/10473, Decision No. 2014/2696:
"The hierarchical structure, which facilitates the management of criminal organizations formed to achieve a specific objective and having reached a level of organization appropriate for that objective, and which ensures their continuity through the division of roles, permanence, and discipline, must be assessed in light of the characteristics of each organization. Such assessment should take into account factors including the size of the organization, the offences it is intended to commit, the nature of those offences, the income groups, educational backgrounds and professional status of its founders, leaders and members, their number, as well as the nature of any relationships existing between them outside the organizational framework, such as common hometown, kinship or professional ties. It should also be recognized that the organization and its activities are necessarily conducted in secrecy and in a concealed manner, and that relations with persons committing offences on behalf of the organization or assisting it are likewise established on the same basis. Within this framework, the hierarchical relationship may be centralized, loose or strict; based on financial interest, power, fear or another motive; independent or parallel to another hierarchy. Such characteristics facilitate the establishment, continuity and secrecy of the criminal organization. Accordingly, the existence and nature of the hierarchical structure must be determined separately for each alleged criminal organization on the basis of these principles.
Since a criminal organization, by its very nature, requires continuity, where individuals come together solely to commit a particular offense or a single criminal act, this constitutes a common criminal intent or joint participation in the offence rather than the existence of a criminal organization."
"As emphasized by the European Court of Human Rights in Hadjianastassiou v. Greece, the requirement that judicial decisions be reasoned constitutes an integral component of the right to a fair trial guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as it is a prerequisite for the effective exercise of the right to appeal. Accordingly, rendering a conviction without explaining how the alleged hierarchical structure of the criminal organization was established, or identifying the evidence proving such structure, and without setting out sufficient reasoning to enable appellate review, is contrary to law."
A criminal organization must possess continuity. This requirement distinguishes an organized criminal structure from a temporary agreement formed solely for the commission of a single offense.
Continuity does not mean that the organization must remain active for a specific period prescribed by law. Instead, the available evidence should demonstrate that the structure was established with the intention of pursuing criminal activities beyond an isolated event and that it possesses the capacity to continue operating over time.
For this reason, even if only one offence has ultimately been committed, a criminal organization may still exist where the evidence establishes that the organization was created to commit multiple offenses whenever opportunities arise.
Conversely, several individuals who jointly commit a single offense pursuant to a temporary plan generally fall within the rules governing joint participation in crime rather than Article 220 TPC.
Relevant excerpt from the decision of the 5th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, File No. 2014/7289, Decision No. 2019/11536:
“For the existence of a criminal organization, concrete evidence must be established showing that the hierarchical structure has continuity in committing the intended offenses. This requires clear findings and data demonstrating the basic structure of the chain of command, supported by statements of suspects, defendants and witnesses and/or evidence obtained through telephone interception, ambient listening, or technical surveillance measures.
Since a criminal organization is not a simple structure, elements such as the use of nicknames in telephone conversations between a few individuals, veiled expressions, face-to-face conversations, meetings, organization charts, mere communication records, or findings showing whom a person called, for how long and how frequently, are not sufficient on their own to establish the existence of a hierarchical structure.
The existence of a criminal organization cannot be accepted merely by repeating and interpreting statutory provisions. It would not be legally sound to define the concept through clichéd, stereotyped and abstract expressions and apply it automatically to every act. The founder, leader and members of the organization must be clearly and indisputably identified, and each person’s role within the structure must be determined concretely, not abstractly.
In light of these principles, considering the defendants’ statements of defence and the entire case file, the court was required to discuss, with reasons, what evidence existed to show that the defendants came together in a planned association involving continuity, division of roles and a common understanding of sharing; that they acted with the purpose of committing acts defined as offenses by law on a continuous basis under a criminal program; that there was a strict or loose hierarchical relationship among them; that there existed a chain of command and a superior-subordinate relationship demonstrating the hierarchical structure; and that, through their activities, the defendants caused the organization to come into existence or, from a superior position, partially or fully organized and coordinated the collective activity.
Without setting out these matters in detail in the judgment, and without explaining, in a manner enabling appellate review, the evidence supporting these conclusions by establishing a logical and legal connection consistent with the contents of the case file, the convictions rendered against the defendants for establishing and managing a criminal organization for the purpose of committing offenses were unlawful.
For these reasons, the appeals of the defendants’ counsel were found to be well-founded. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 321 of the former Criminal Procedure Code, also taking into account Article 8/1 of Law No. 5320, the judgments were QUASHED.”
The organization must be established for the purpose of committing offenses.
Importantly, Article 220 does not require that every intended offense be completed before criminal liability arises. The offense is considered complete once an organization satisfying the statutory criteria has been established with the objective of committing criminal acts.
This reflects the preventive nature of Article 220. Turkish criminal law seeks to protect public order by criminalizing the creation of dangerous criminal structures before they are capable of causing broader harm.
However, the prosecution must demonstrate that the criminal purpose is genuine and supported by objective evidence. Mere suspicion, social relationships or lawful commercial cooperation cannot justify the conclusion that an organization was formed for criminal purposes.
Finally, the alleged organization must possess a degree of organizational capability sufficient to pursue its criminal objectives.
This does not require a sophisticated or nationwide network. Nevertheless, the organization should demonstrate practical capacity through its structure, allocation of responsibilities, available resources or methods of operation.
Courts therefore examine whether the organization was realistically capable of carrying out the criminal activities alleged by the prosecution. A purely theoretical agreement unsupported by any operational structure is generally insufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 220.
For this reason, every organized criminal allegation requires a comprehensive evaluation of all factual circumstances rather than reliance upon isolated pieces of evidence viewed independently.
One of the most significant legal questions arising under Article 220 TPC is whether the conduct of several individuals constitutes a criminal organization or merely joint participation in the commission of an offence. Although both situations involve more than one person, they are governed by fundamentally different legal principles and may result in substantially different criminal consequences.
Under Turkish criminal law, joint participation in crime refers to the cooperation of two or more individuals in committing a particular criminal offense. Their criminal liability derives directly from the offence itself. Once the planned offence has been completed—or the attempt has ended—the legal relationship between the participants ordinarily comes to an end.
A criminal organization, by contrast, exists independently of any single offence. The organization represents a continuing structure established for the purpose of committing criminal acts whenever circumstances permit. Individual offences committed by members are regarded as manifestations of the organization's broader criminal objective rather than isolated incidents.
For this reason, Article 220 requires considerably more than proof that several individuals acted together. The prosecution must establish that the participants formed an organized structure possessing continuity, internal coordination and a common criminal purpose extending beyond a single offense.
This distinction carries significant practical consequences. Where the statutory requirements of Article 220 are not satisfied, suspects cannot be convicted solely because they acted together in committing a crime. In such circumstances, criminal liability must instead be assessed under the general provisions governing principals, co-perpetrators, instigators or aiders and abettors contained elsewhere in the Turkish Penal Code.
The distinction between organized crime and ordinary criminal participation is not merely theoretical.
A finding that a criminal organization exists exposes suspects to separate criminal liability in addition to responsibility for the underlying offences. It may also affect the investigative powers available to prosecutors, influence detention decisions, and substantially increase the overall criminal penalties that may ultimately be imposed.
Consequently, defence counsel frequently examine whether the prosecution has genuinely established the structural characteristics required by Article 220 or has merely relied upon the existence of communication between suspects, family relationships, commercial interactions or simultaneous participation in one or more offences.
Turkish courts consistently underline that none of these circumstances, considered individually, automatically proves the existence of a criminal organization. Frequent telephone contact, friendship, kinship, business cooperation or coordinated conduct may constitute relevant evidence, but they cannot replace proof of the legal elements that define an organized criminal structure.
Instead, courts evaluate all available evidence as a whole. The decisive issue is whether the alleged participants functioned as members of a continuing organizational structure established for criminal purposes rather than as individuals temporarily cooperating in relation to a specific offense.
In practice, Turkish criminal courts conduct a comprehensive factual assessment before concluding that Article 220 applies.
Rather than focusing exclusively on the number of participants or the seriousness of the alleged offences, courts examine questions such as:
Was there a stable organizational structure?
Did the participants assume different and complementary roles?
Was there an identifiable system of coordination or leadership?
Did the group possess continuity beyond a single criminal event?
Was the organization capable of pursuing criminal objectives over time?
Only where these questions are answered affirmatively on the basis of reliable evidence can criminal liability under Article 220 generally be established.
This case-by-case assessment reflects a fundamental principle of Turkish criminal law: allegations of organized crime require proof of an actual criminal organization, not merely the existence of collective criminal conduct.
Article 220 TPC establishes separate forms of criminal liability depending on an individual's role within the alleged criminal organization. Turkish criminal law therefore distinguishes between founders, managers and members, each of whom may bear criminal responsibility under different legal standards.
This distinction reflects the principle that criminal liability should correspond to the individual's actual contribution to the existence and functioning of the organization. Accordingly, prosecutors must establish not only that a criminal organization existed but also the precise role allegedly performed by each suspect within that structure.
A person who takes the initiative to establish a criminal organization may incur criminal liability as a founder under Article 220.
Founding an organization involves more than merely participating in criminal activities. The prosecution must demonstrate that the individual played a decisive role in creating the organizational structure itself and that the organization was established for the purpose of committing offenses.
Evidence frequently relied upon in such cases may include the individual's role in recruiting participants, designing the organizational framework, coordinating the activities of members or otherwise creating the structure that enabled the organization to operate.
However, participation in the commission of several offences does not automatically establish that an individual founded a criminal organization. The decisive issue remains whether the evidence demonstrates involvement in creating the organization itself rather than simply taking part in its alleged criminal activities.
Criminal liability may also arise for individuals who manage or direct an existing criminal organization.
Management generally involves exercising authority over the organization's activities, coordinating members, making strategic decisions or directing the execution of criminal objectives.
Importantly, managerial responsibility does not necessarily depend upon formal titles or explicit chains of command. Turkish courts focus on the individual's actual influence within the organization rather than the terminology used by its members.
The prosecution must therefore establish that the suspect exercised genuine decision-making authority within the organizational structure rather than merely participating in criminal conduct alongside others.
Membership represents one of the most frequently litigated aspects of Article 220.
To establish membership, the prosecution must demonstrate that the suspect knowingly and willingly became part of the criminal organization and accepted its organizational discipline and criminal purpose.
This assessment cannot be based solely upon acquaintance with other suspects, family relationships, business contacts or occasional communication. Nor does participation in an isolated criminal incident automatically establish organizational membership.
Instead, courts evaluate whether the available evidence demonstrates a continuing relationship with the organization, voluntary participation in its activities and integration into its hierarchical structure.
For this reason, the distinction between organizational membership and ordinary criminal participation frequently becomes the central issue during criminal proceedings.
Relevant excerpt from the decision of the 16th Criminal Chamber of the Court of Cassation, File No. 2020/3507, Decision No. 2020/4823:
“A member of a criminal organization is a person who embraces the objectives of the organization, becomes part of its hierarchical structure, and, by subordinating his or her own will to the will of the organization, remains ready to carry out the tasks assigned within that structure.
Membership in a criminal organization signifies joining and committing oneself to the organization and submitting to the authority of its hierarchical command.
A member must establish an organic link with the organization and actively participate in its activities. An organic link is a living, continuous and effective connection that keeps the individual available to receive orders and instructions and determines his or her position within the organizational hierarchy. This organic link constitutes the most essential element of criminal organization membership.”
A fundamental principle of Turkish criminal law is that criminal liability is personal.
Accordingly, prosecutors must prove the criminal responsibility of each suspect individually. Membership in an alleged organization cannot be presumed solely because another individual has been identified as a founder or manager, nor may criminal responsibility be inferred merely from personal associations or social relationships.
Each defendant is entitled to an independent assessment of the evidence concerning his or her own conduct. Courts must therefore determine whether the statutory elements of Article 220 have been established separately for every accused person.
This principle is particularly important in complex investigations involving multiple defendants, where the prosecution may seek to characterize a broad network of individuals as members of a single criminal organization despite significant differences in their respective roles.
Article 220 does not replace criminal liability for the offences allegedly committed by the organization.
Where the evidence establishes that members of a criminal organization have also committed substantive criminal offences, liability for those offenses is assessed separately under the relevant provisions of the Turkish Penal Code.
Accordingly, a defendant may, depending on the circumstances of the case, face allegations both under Article 220 and in relation to the underlying offenses allegedly committed by the organization.
Whether multiple offenses have been properly attributed to a particular defendant remains a matter requiring separate legal analysis based upon the available evidence and the applicable rules governing criminal responsibility.
Investigations conducted under Article 220 TPC frequently involve extensive procedural measures due to the nature of organized crime allegations. Nevertheless, all investigative powers remain subject to the safeguards established by the Turkish Criminal Procedure Code ("CPC") and the constitutional guarantees applicable to every criminal investigation.
Neither the seriousness of the allegation nor the public interest in combating organized crime removes the prosecution's obligation to act within the limits prescribed by law. Evidence obtained in violation of procedural safeguards may be challenged before the criminal courts and, where appropriate, excluded from consideration.
Depending on the circumstances of the case and the applicable statutory requirements, prosecutors may request various investigative measures during an organized crime investigation.
These measures may include:
search and seizure;
examination of digital devices and electronic evidence;
interception of communications where legally authorised;
collection of financial and commercial records;
witness statements and expert examinations.
Each investigative measure requires its own legal basis and must comply with the proportionality principle. Turkish criminal courts evaluate not only whether the evidence supports the allegations but also whether it has been obtained in accordance with procedural law.
Individuals investigated under Article 220 may be taken into police custody where the statutory conditions are satisfied.
Following police custody, the public prosecutor may either order the suspect's release, impose alternative procedural measures where permitted by law, or refer the suspect to the Criminal Judgeship of Peace with a request for pre-trial detention.
Pre-trial detention is not an automatic consequence of an allegation under Article 220. As with every criminal offence, detention may only be ordered where the legal conditions established by the Criminal Procedure Code have been satisfied and where less restrictive measures would be insufficient to secure the proper administration of justice.
Throughout this process, the proportionality principle remains of central importance. Turkish courts are required to assess whether detention is genuinely necessary in light of the specific circumstances of the individual case.
Every person investigated under Article 220 benefits from the procedural guarantees provided by Turkish law.
These rights include, among others:
the right to remain silent;
the right to legal assistance;
the right to be informed of the allegations;
the right to examine the evidence within the limits prescribed by procedural law;
the right to present exculpatory evidence;
the right to challenge unlawful investigative measures.
The effective exercise of these rights is often decisive, particularly during the early stages of an organized crime investigation when the prosecution is attempting to establish the existence of an alleged criminal organization.
Early legal representation frequently plays a significant role in organized crime investigations.
Because Article 220 cases often involve extensive documentary evidence, digital records and communications between numerous suspects, defence strategy should ordinarily begin during the investigation rather than after the filing of an indictment.
A defence lawyer may assist in reviewing the prosecution's allegations, identifying procedural irregularities, protecting the suspect's procedural rights and ensuring that exculpatory evidence is collected and presented at the earliest possible stage.
For this reason, legal representation should not merely be viewed as a procedural formality but as an essential safeguard within the criminal justice process.
No two organized crime investigations are identical. Accordingly, an effective defence strategy should always be developed in light of the particular facts, available evidence and procedural history of the individual case.
In practice, defence lawyers frequently examine whether the prosecution has established every statutory element required by Article 220 rather than focusing exclusively on the alleged underlying offences.
Depending on the circumstances, the defence may argue that:
no hierarchical structure existed;
the alleged cooperation related only to a single criminal incident;
continuity has not been established;
the evidence demonstrates ordinary criminal participation rather than an organized criminal structure;
investigative measures were unlawful or disproportionate;
digital or documentary evidence has been misinterpreted;
the prosecution has failed to establish the defendant's individual criminal responsibility.
Where appropriate, defence counsel may also challenge the legality of searches, seizures, interception measures or other investigative actions that fail to comply with the procedural safeguards established by Turkish law.
Ultimately, organized crime allegations should be assessed on the basis of objective legal criteria rather than assumptions arising from the seriousness of the allegations or the number of individuals under investigation.
Article 220 of the Turkish Penal Code serves an important role in combating organized criminal activity while simultaneously requiring strict compliance with the fundamental principles of criminal law.
The existence of a criminal organization cannot be presumed merely because several individuals acted together or because the alleged offences are serious. Prosecutors must establish every statutory element of the offence through lawful and reliable evidence, and criminal courts must carefully distinguish organized criminal structures from ordinary participation in crime.
Given the potentially severe legal consequences of allegations under Article 220, both the substantive requirements of the offence and the procedural safeguards governing criminal investigations require careful legal analysis in every individual case.
At Tasdogen & Partners, we represent both Turkish citizens and foreign nationals in criminal investigations and prosecutions involving allegations of organized crime and other serious offenses.
Our legal assistance covers every stage of the criminal process, including police interviews, prosecutor examinations, detention proceedings, pre-trial investigations, criminal trials and appellate proceedings. We provide legal advice in English and develop defence strategies tailored to the specific facts and procedural history of each case.
If you are facing an investigation under Article 220 of the Turkish Penal Code or require an independent legal assessment of your case, obtaining legal advice at the earliest possible stage may significantly contribute to the effective protection of your procedural rights.
Talha Tasdogen
Attorney at Law
Tasdogen & Partners
Related Articles
Foreign Nationals Facing Criminal Charges in Turkey : Legal Rights and Procedure
Offense of Importing Narcotic Drugs (ArtIcle 188 of the Turkish Penal Code)
Drug Trafficking in Turkey: Criminal Penalties Under Article 188 of the Turkish Penal Code